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1Optimal Defensive Resource Allocation for a Centrality-Based
Security Game on Multi-Hop Networks
James R. Riehl† and Ming Cao†
Abstract—We present a new analysis of multi-hop net-
work security in the form of a zero-sum game played
between an attacker who tries to disrupt a network by
disabling one or more nodes, and the nodes of the network
who must allocate limited resources in defense of the
network. The payoffs in the zero-sum game can be one
of several performance metrics that correspond to node
centrality measures. In the case of single-node attacks, we
use a monotonicity property of the mixed attack strategies
to construct a simple and very fast algorithm to compute
saddle-point equilibrium strategies for both single-node
and multiple-node defense. For simultaneous multiple-node
attacks on large networks, the computational complexity
becomes quite high, so we present a method to approximate
the equilibrium strategies based on a sequential simplifica-
tion, which performs well in simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
As society grows ever more reliant on complex and
dynamic networked systems for applications such as
communication, transportation, distributed sensing, and
control, these systems are increasingly vulnerable to
attacks by malicious adversaries, and it becomes critical
to secure them against such attacks. However, both attack
and defense to a network generally require significant
energy or resources, and there may not be enough to
cover an entire network. For example, a distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attack requires energy and
bandwidth from multiple coordinating attackers who
try to deplete the memory or bandwidth resources of
the targeted system. Similarly, such an attack can be
defended by adding memory or bandwidth capacity to
vulnerable nodes in the network [1]. The decision on
how to allocate these resources to the nodes is therefore
crucial to the effective defense of the network. In this
paper, we consider this problem from the perspective of
a central network administrator who has full information
about the network and is responsible for maximizing
one of several possible performance metrics that can be
mapped to node centrality measures.
Although centrality measures were originally intro-
duced in the context of social network analysis, their
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use has already gained traction in the communication
and control literature. In particular, the authors of [2]
studied the effects of coordinated attacks on wireless
mesh networks and showed that targeting the nodes
with the highest betweenness centrality results in a more
effective attack than targeting based on degree, a result
supported by earlier studies on the attack vulnerability
of complex networks [3]. However, this strategy might
easily be predicted and thwarted by a smart defender.
Game theory offers a set of tools that are ideally suited to
such competitive settings and for this reason has become
widely adopted in the study of network security [4][5].
Despite these emerging research trends, this work is the
first we are aware of to combine the tools of social
network analysis and game theory towards the solution
of a highly practical network security problem.
The problem we consider here is essentially one of
resource allocation in the presence of an adversary, and
there does exist some relevant literature on this topic.
For example in [6], two teams allocate power between
communicating with teammates and jamming the other
team’s communications. After formulating the problem
as a zero-sum differential game, sufficient conditions
on the agent parameters are given for existence of a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The optimal design of
resource allocation networks subject to attacks is studied
in [7], where it is shown that networks with a star
topology are optimal from the perspective of a de-
fender. In a transportation setting, path-planning against
adversaries was formulated as a distributed resource
allocation problem and a linear-programming solution
was proposed [8]. Finally, agent-based simulations are
used in [9] to determine Nash equilibrium strategies in a
network security game where both attacker and defender
are subject to cost constraints.
In this paper we introduce a linear-time algorithm to
compute saddle-point equilibrium strategies for both the
attacker and defender in the case of single-node attacks
and multiple-node defense. When multiple nodes are
attacked simultaneously, we propose an approximation
algorithm based on a sequential simplification of the
attack strategies. These algorithms provide a network
administrator with the probabilities that each node should
be protected. An extension that allows distributed com-
putation of the defense policies is considered in [10].
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II. PRELIMINARIES
Before we address the central question of this paper,
we briefly review two subjects that are fundamental to
understanding the problem and solution approach: node
centrality and zero-sum game theory.
A. Node Centrality
The centrality of a node can be thought of as the
importance of a node in the context of the network, and
there are many different measures of centrality related to
various notions of importance. One notable example is
betweenness, which is the fraction of all shortest paths









Fig. 1. Betweenness centrality on a small network
node undirected network shown in Fig. 1. Their are ten
different node pairings in this network but twelve paths
that are shortest paths between pairs of nodes:
ab, abc, abd, {abce, abde}, bc, bd,
{bce, bde}, {cbd, ced}, ce, de, (1)
where bracketed sets of paths indicate when there are
multiple shortest paths connecting two nodes. The be-
tweenness of each node is then obtained by counting the
total number of shortest paths in which a node appears,
dividing by k when the path is one of k shortest paths
connecting two nodes. Finally, we divide by the total
number of node pairs in the network so that the result lies
between zero and one. Checking each path in (1), we see









7.5 out of the 10 node pairs, or 0.75 of the shortest paths
in the network, supporting the intuitive observation that
b is an important node in this communication network.†
Although we focus on the example of betweenness in
this paper, the results apply to any network performance
metric that can be decomposed into individual node
contributions via a centrality measure.
†Our definition of betweenness actually differs slightly from stan-
dard betweenness definitions because we count being an endpoint of
a path as being on the path while standard definitions typically do
not. The reason is that for our purposes the endpoint nodes are just as
important to the communication link as any intermediate node.
When multiple nodes are attacked simultaneously, it
will not generally be possible to measure the effect of
the attack on network performance from the individual
node centrality values. Therefore we need to define the
centrality of a node set, which we can motivate with an
example. Consider two-node attacks to sets {a, b} and
{b, e} in the network of Fig. 1. We want to evaluate the
removal of these node pairs from the network, which
in the case of betweenness, corresponds to the fraction
of shortest paths containing at least one of the removed
nodes. For {a, b} this comes to 0.75 since every path
that contains a also contains b. On the other hand, node
e is on every shortest path that does not contain b, so
the betweenness of {b, e} is 1. Similar modifications
can often be made to adapt other single-node centrality
measures to apply to node sets.
B. Zero-Sum Game Theory
In a game, two or more players choose from a set of
strategies in pursuit of different and often competing ob-
jectives and receive payoffs that depend on the strategies
of all players. A two-player zero-sum game is a game
in which one player’s gain is equal to the other player’s
loss and is commonly modeled using a payoff matrix
where one player is the minimizer and the other is the
maximizer. The players choose from a set S of finite
pure strategies, but they can randomize their choices in
what is called a mixed-strategy, i.e a vector of length |S|
whose elements are all non-negative and sum to one.
Two-player games with finite strategies always admit
a unique saddle-point equilibrium in mixed strategies
[11]. A well-known example of this is in the rock-
scissors-paper game where the equilibrium corresponds
to both players using each of {rock, scissors, paper} with
probability one-third. This result illustrates a key concept
in game theory, which is the principle of indifference, the
idea being that if I am playing a saddle-point equilibrium
mixed strategy, my opponent can pick from several
strategies without seeing any change in payoff, and is
thus indifferent to which strategy to play.
III. PROBLEM SETUP
In this formulation, we assume that attacks target one
or more nodes in the network, and that an attack on
an unprotected node results in the removal of that node
from the network. On the other hand, a protected node
is immune to attack and cannot be removed. Taking the
viewpoint of a defender who wants to maximize the
performance of the network in the presence of worst-case
attacks, we assume that the attacker has full information
about the network except for which nodes are defended.
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Since a worst-case attacker wants to minimize the
same performance metric that the defender wants to
maximize, this problem fits well into the setting of a
two-player zero-sum game, where the attacker tries to
maximally disrupt the network by disabling one or more
nodes and a defender must choose which nodes to protect
in order to best defend the network against such an
attack. We can express the problem in general form as






where y and z are mixed strategies of the attacker and de-
fender, respectively, and v∗ is the expected performance
change to the network. We denote by ∆A and ∆D the
mixed-strategy simplexes over pure strategy attack and
defense sets A and D, which will depend on the number
of nodes attacked (α) and defended (δ).
A. Single-Node Attack / Single-Node Defense
We begin with the case where the attacker and de-
fender each have only enough resources to attack or
defend one node, resulting in pure strategy sets that map
directly to the nodes in the network, i.e. A = D := V ,
where V := {1, . . . , n}. To construct the payoff matrix,
we observe that each entry Aij should correspond to the
change in network performance when node i is attacked
and node j is defended. Since a defended attack results
in no change to the network, A should have zeros on the
diagonal. All other entries correspond to an undefended
attack on node i, whose removal from the network results
in a performance loss exactly equal to its centrality value,




def1 def2 · · · defn
att1 0 −a1 · · · −a1






attn −an −an · · · 0
, (3)
where atti and defj respectively indicate attack to node
i and defense of node j.
B. Single-Node Attack / Multiple-Node Defense
In the previous section we assumed that both the
attacker and defender could only target a single node,
but it is easy to imagine that the defender might have
enough resources to protect δ > 1 nodes. In this case,
the attack strategy set ∆A remains the same as before,
but the defense strategy set expands to cover all possible
combinations of defended nodes. Let Vk denote the set of
all subsets consisting of k distinct nodes in the network.
Then we have the pure strategy set D := Vδ and ∆D
becomes the mixed-strategy simplex over D. Let D(j)
denote the jth set of δ nodes under some enumeration
of the set D. Each entry Aij in the payoff matrix
now corresponds to the expected change in network
performance when node i is attacked and the nodes D(j)
are defended. Therefore Aij = 0 whenever i ∈ D(j) and
Aij = −ai otherwise.
C. Multiple-Node Attack / Multiple-Node Defense
Next we consider the case where the attacker also has
enough resources to target α > 1 nodes. Now the pure
attack strategy set is A := Vα, the pure defense strategy
set remains D := Vδ , and each entry Aij corresponds to
the expected network performance change when nodes
A(i) are attacked and nodes D(j) are defended. Recall
that we defined the centrality of a node set in Section
II-A as the effect on network performance when that set
of nodes is removed from the network. Hence Aij is
equal to the centrality of the node set Aα(i) − Dδ(j)
whenever this set is nonempty, and 0 otherwise.
IV. SOLUTION: SINGLE-NODE ATTACKS
Problem (2) is in a standard form that is known to
be solvable by linear programming (LP), and although
there are LP algorithms that run in polynomial time [12],
this can still be a computational burden when working
with very large networks. Moreover, the payoff matrices
grow combinatorially with the number of attack and
defense nodes, providing an even stronger motivation
to develop faster solution algorithms. In this section we
present a simple and very fast algorithm to compute the
saddle-point equilibrium strategies against single-node
attacks, made possible by the following facts that follow
from standard properties of mixed-strategy saddle-point
equilibria (proofs can be found in [10]):
1) Equilibrium mixed-strategies correspond to a sub-
set of nodes, which we call support nodes
2) Support nodes are those with the highest centrality
3) Principle of indifference applies to support nodes
4) At equilibrium, all non-support pure strategies are
strictly dominated
The key insight behind our approach is that the ex-
pected payoff resulting from a mixed attack strategy is
monotone in the addition of pure strategies or nodes.
In other words, when choosing between two nodes to
add to a mixed attack strategy, it is always better to
choose the node with the higher centrality. This means
3
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we can incrementally construct a mixed defense strategy
by adding support nodes in order of decreasing centrality
until all remaining pure strategies are dominated.
We start by sorting the node centralities from highest
to lowest in the vector a˜ := Pa, where P is the appro-
priate permutation matrix. Algorithm 1 then proceeds
as follows. The counting index k is initialized to 1
and incremented for every node that is added to the
mixed strategy, while σk is the negated cumulative sum
of reciprocal centralities. These quantities are used to
update the expected payoff value vk, and the loop is
repeated until either vk is less than the next highest
negated centrality value −a˜k+1 or k = n. Note that if
vk < −a˜k+1, that means all remaining pure strategies are
strictly dominated, i.e. there is no reason for the attacker
to consider attacking any of the remaining nodes because
it would only decrease the effectiveness of the attack.
This value of vk is in fact the saddle-point equilibrium
value, and the corresponding strategies y˜ and z˜ are
calculated in steps 9 and 10.





4 k := k + 1




7 until vk < −ak+1 or k = n




10 z˜i := 1− vk−a˜i
11 end
12 v∗ := vk
Algorithm 1: Computes saddle-point equilibrium value
and strategies of (2) for single-node attacks.
The equilibrium strategies for the original game can
then easily be constructed by using the inverse ordering
of a˜ to assign the k values of y˜ and z˜ to the correspond-
ing entries in y and z and setting the remaining values to
zero. The following theorem confirms that this algorithm
achieves the desired result for single-node attack and
defense (proof in [10]).
Theorem 1: Algorithm 1 computes the unique saddle-
point equilibrium value v∗ to problem (2) for single-node
attack and single-node defense strategies.
It turns out that Algorithm 1 can also be used to
solve for the case of multiple-node defense with only a
small modification. To see how, note that the particular
combination of nodes defended does not matter in the
single-node attack case. All that does matter is whether
a node is defended or not. Recall that the mixed strategy





corresponding to the pure
strategies of defending every possible combination of δ
nodes, but let us define a new n-length vector z¯, which
contains the probability that each node in the network is
defended. We will also define z˜ = P z¯. Note that z¯ is not
a mixed strategy since its values do not sum to one, but it
serves the purpose of the algorithm anyway, and later we
can construct a mixed-strategy z by solving the under-
determined system of equations Az = diag(−a)(1n−z¯).
The following theorem extends Theorem 1 to the case
of multiple-node defense (proof in [10]).
Theorem 2: Algorithm 1 computes the unique saddle-
point equilibrium value v∗ to problem (2) for single-node
attack and multiple-node defense strategies.
Remark 1: The inside of each loop in Algorithm 1
contains a fixed number of operations and is repeated
a maximum of n times resulting in a total number of
operations that is in the worst case O(n), i.e. linear in
the number of nodes in the network. For comparison
purposes, polynomial-time algorithms for linear pro-
gramming have computational complexity in the neigh-
borhood of O(n3.5) [13].
V. APPROXIMATION: MULTIPLE-NODE ATTACKS
The possibility of simultaneous attacks to multiple
nodes adds additional complexity to the problem because
the specific combinations of nodes attacked and defended
becomes more important. We can no longer consider
the removal of nodes from the network in isolation,
but rather we must capture the inter-dependencies of
nodes on network performance through the concept of
node-set centrality, introduced in Section II-A. Although
the resulting problem (2) remains computable by linear
programming, the size of the payoff matrix grows combi-
natorially in the number of nodes attacked and defended.
As an example, the payoff matrix for 5-node attack
and defense strategies on a 50 node network contains
over 2 million × 2 million entries. Unfortunately, we
no longer have monotonicity of the mixed-strategies and
therefore cannot use Algorithm 1 to simplify and solve
this problem exactly.
However, there is a technique that can greatly reduce
the computation at a minimal cost to optimality. The key
is to realize that similar to the single-node attack case, it
is likely that in most practical networks only a few of the
large number of possible attack combinations will play
a role in the equilibrium solution. If we could somehow
identify the most effective attacks without computing
the entire payoff matrix, we could save a substantial
amount of computation. The method we propose in the
4
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next section computes the most effective sequences of
attacks in order to predict the most effective parallel
attack strategies from the full payoff matrix.
A. Sequential Approximation Algorithm
Algorithm 2 begins by using Algorithm 1 to find the
support nodes for a single-node attack (step 1) and adds
these nodes to the initial attack set (step 2) which we
will augment incrementally (step 3) using the following
procedure. Starting from an initially empty set of new
attack nodes (step 4), for each attack combination in the
previous iteration (step 5), we remove those nodes from
the network (step 6) and update the centrality values for
the remaining nodes on the reduced network Vˆ (step 7),
resulting in the new payoff matrix Aˆ. We then reuse
Algorithm 1 in sequence to find the next set of support
nodes (step 8) (presuming the attacker has successfully
removed the nodes Aˆk−1(i) from the network). This step
is the essence of the sequential simplification. Next we
construct new attack sets from every unique combination
of the k− 1-node attack sets and the new support nodes
(step 9) and then repeat the process. Finally, we set the
defense set equal to the attack set, adjusting for size if
δ 6= α (step 12) and solve the reduced game using linear
programming (step 13).
1 yˆ := arg miny∈∆V maxz∈∆Vδ+1 y
TAz
2 Aˆ1 := {i : yˆi > 0}
3 for k := 2 to α do
4 Aˆk := ∅
5 for i := 1 to |Aˆ| do
6 Vˆ := V − Aˆk−1(i)
7 Compute centralities aˆ on Vˆ
8 yˆ := arg miny∈∆Vˆ maxz∈∆Vˆδ−k+2 y
T Aˆz
9 Aˆk := Aˆk ∪ Aˆk−1(i)× {j : yˆj > 0}
10 end
11 end
12 Aˆk → Dˆ
13 vˆ := miny∈∆Aˆα maxz∈∆Dˆ y
TAz
Algorithm 2: Algorithm to approximate saddle-point
equilibrium value and strategies of (2) for the case of
multiple-node attacks based on a sequential simplifica-
tion.
B. Simulations
It is quite difficult to derive analytical measures for
how closely Algorithm 2 approximates the saddle-point
equilibrium defense strategy in general, but we can test
it on a model of a real network as well as a range
of randomly generated networks and compare to other
potential defense strategies, including the exact solution
of (2) provided the networks are small enough. We begin
by testing the approach on connectivity data of the UCSB
MeshNet, a real experimental wireless mesh network









Fig. 2. Results of Algorithm 2 applied to the UCSB MeshNet data from
a particular instant of time. The shading of the nodes is proportional
to the adjacent numbers which are the probabilities that each node will
be defended as part of a three-node mixed defense strategy against a
three-node attack.
Fig. 2 shows the network along with the computed
mixed defense strategy for three-node defense against a
three-node attack. We compared the sequential approxi-
mation to two other defense strategies: (1) a pure strat-
egy, which defends the three nodes having the highest
betweenness centrality, and (2) random sampling, which
samples the payoff matrix by randomly choosing 20%
of the possible node combinations and solving the game
on the resulting reduced payoff matrix. The random sam-
pling approach is inspired by [14] and has the advantage
of approximation guarantees assuming the attacker is
also using random sampling. However, in order to make
an unbiased comparison between strategies, we assume
the attacker plays the equilibrium strategy against what-
ever strategy the defender is using. For the pure strategy,
this means the attacker knows the defender will defend
the three most central nodes and thus will not attack
those nodes, while for the sequential approximation,
this means the attacker knows which columns of the
payoff matrix the defender has chosen. Table I shows
the expected payoffs for each of these defense strategies
as well as the true saddle-point equilibrium strategy.
Notice that the attacker playing against the sequential
approximation can still not improve on the equilibrium








Saddle-Point Equil. -0.171 -0.273 -0.342
Sequential Approx. -0.171 -0.273 -0.342
Random Sampling -0.193 -0.279 -0.349
Pure Strategy -0.232 -0.402 -0.539
Next, we tested the accuracy of Algorithm 2 against
the two other approaches for a two-node attack and
defense scenario on 100 random geometric networks of
increasing size, generated by randomly placing n nodes
the unit square and connecting any pair of nodes that
were closer than a distance threshold of 0.4 from each
other. Fig. 3 shows the expected fraction of performance
loss ( vˆ−v
∗
v∗ ) of the three approaches compared to the
equilibrium payoff, and Fig. 4 compares the average time
required to compute the sequential approximation to that
for the full payoff matrix and linear programming (LP)
solution. We see that the sequential approximation comes
quite close to the exact solution with a relatively flat
computation time compared to the LP.




















Fig. 3. Mean fraction of expected performance loss of the three
approximation methods over 100 random geometric networks of five
different sizes.














Fig. 4. Mean computation times of the sequential approximation
compared to solving the exact solution via linear programming.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have formulated a topological net-
work security problem as a zero-sum game between
an attacker and defender with the goal of determining
which nodes to protect in a network when resources
are limited. In the case of a single-node attack, we
presented a simple and fast algorithm to compute the
equilibrium strategies for both single-node and multiple-
node defense. For multiple-node attacks the problem
increases in complexity, so we investigated a sequential
approximation to the saddle-point equilibrium defense
strategy and simulations showed that this method closely
approximates the exact solution at greatly reduced com-
putation. We are currently working on extending the
process to the distributed setting, using only local in-
formation to compute defense strategies [10].
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